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Evaluating the Impact of Contracting “Tripwires” on 
Service Acquisitions1 
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Abstract 
Service contracts are a significant component of DoD spending. The DoD relies on the 
private sector for a wide range of services (e.g., consulting and administrative support, 
information technology services, product management services, and base operations 
support) in order to facilitate the delivery of important defense capabilities.   
In an effort to better monitor performance of service contracts, the DoD has implemented a 
program of contracting “tripwires.” These are defined as “pre- and post-award metrics that 
provide visibility into areas of vulnerability and risk in the acquisition of services that require 
greater visibility and decisions by higher levels of management” (Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics [OUSD(AT&L)], 2016). The 
report evaluates how tripwire implementation, on the whole and in specific instances, has 
impacted acquisition outcomes and examines the empirical basis for specific tripwire 
thresholds and their approval authorities.  
DoD leadership was careful to clarify that “tripwires are not intended to restrict execution, but 
instead to alert and require higher-level awareness and action to remedy potential cost, 
schedule, or performance issues.” This clarification proved necessary yet insufficient, and 
shortly after their introduction, reports surfaced that contracting officers were taking pains to 
avoid tripping any of the thresholds.  
Tripwires implementation has resulted in mixed reviews. Those related to cost, specifically 




1 This research was partially sponsored by a grant from the Naval Postgraduate School. 
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tripwire categories shows a positive impact. Tripwires related to bridge contracts provided 
insight into their use and reduced the total amount of bridge contracts used, leading to better 
acquisition planning. Tripwires relating to one bids also led to better acquisition outcomes by 
providing greater insight into why only one bid was being received for a proposal. And 
tripwires related to best value procurements provided important insight into whether the best 
value was being attained as a result of paying more for a contract.  
Introduction 
Since FY2015, substantial shifts in the defense acquisition system have occurred as 
contract obligations have increased following a period of sequestration and the defense 
drawdown. In addition to topline contract growth, changes in administration have created 
new priorities and policies at the Department of Defense (DoD). These changes will 
influence what the DoD buys and what strategies contractors will use to meet these 
requirements. 
In particular, service contracting will continue to remain a significant component of 
DoD spending. The DoD relies on the private sector for a wide range of services (e.g., 
consulting and administrative support, information technology services, product 
management services, and base operations support) in order to facilitate the delivery of 
important defense capabilities. Although most public attention to defense acquisition focuses 
on Major Defense Acquisition Programs and R&D contracts, service contracts make up a 
significant share of DoD contract obligations, averaging 42% since FY2000 (McCormick, 
Cohen, Sanders, & Hunter, et al., p. 6). 
Although growth in service contract obligations has lagged behind topline growth, 
falling from 44% of total contract obligations in FY2015 to 41%, service contracts have 
continued to grow in recent years. From FY2015 to FY2017, obligations for service contracts 
increased 5%, from $125.5 billion to approximately $132.1 billion (McCormick et al., p. 6). 
Because service contracting is such a significant component of total DoD spending and is 
continuing to grow, several initiatives have been implemented in an effort to improve its 
efficiency. One such initiative has been the introduction of contracting “tripwires.” 
The DoD defines tripwires as “pre- and post-award metrics that provide visibility into 
areas of vulnerability and risk in the acquisition of services that require greater visibility and 
decisions by higher levels of management” (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics [OUSD(AT&L), 2016]). Some areas of risk that tripwires 
address include performance, cost, schedule, and fraud. Tripwires vary by DoD component 
as do threshold values and approval authorities for each tripwire category. These categories 
include labor rates, best-value source selection premiums, bridge contract lengths, 
subcontractor additions, acquisitions in which only one offer is received, “other direct costs,” 
and the award of interagency agreements pursuant to the Economy Act.2 Crossing or 
“tripping” a tripwire generally requires prior approval by the procuring contracting officer and 
the program manager or, in some instances, the chief of the contracting office.  
In January 2016, a binding instruction issued by the under secretary of defense for 




2 The Economy Act (31 U.S.C. 1535) authorizes agencies to enter into agreements to obtain supplies 
or services from another agency. 
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employ tripwires “to the maximum extent practical.” Anticipating how the 2016 mandate 
might be perceived by front-line contracting personnel, DoD leadership was careful to clarify 
that “tripwires are not intended to restrict execution, but instead to alert and require higher-
level awareness and action to remedy potential cost, schedule, or performance issues.” This 
clarification proved necessary yet insufficient. Shortly after tripwires were introduced, reports 
surfaced that contracting officers were taking pains “to avoid ‘tripping’ any of the thresholds 
that require[d] higher level oversight, even when they believed it was the right action for the 
Navy” (Chvotkin, 2012). 
Tripwire implementation has also raised some concerns. Tripwires vary by DoD 
component as do threshold values and approval authorities for each tripwire category. In 
some instances, it is unclear whether threshold values have an empirical basis (e.g., the 
post-award limitation on subcontracting or the constraint on selecting best value); in others 
(e.g., burdened labor rates) the thresholds may be the result of faulty reasoning.  
Report Roadmap 
In light of current fiscal and conditions and budget projections, the government must 
ensure that its acquisition rules, policies, and processes are having the intended effect—
achieving the best value for the American people. The objective of this report is to determine 
how tripwire implementation, on the whole and in specific instances, has impacted services’ 
acquisition outcomes. It seeks to answer the following questions: Do service contracting 
tripwires improve performance and reduce costs? Have tripwires measurably improved 
service acquisition outcomes, or have they added to the rigidity already present within the 
acquisition system? Is there an empirical basis for existing tripwire thresholds, and how are 
they approved by authorities? We begin with a brief background of service contracting and 
the different tripwire categories that can be applied. We include a literature review of 
relevant principal–agent theory literature. Next, we examine the use and outcomes of 
several different tripwire categories. We then summarize our findings and list 
recommendations, before providing closing remarks.  
Background 
The DoD is the federal government’s largest buyer of contracted services, which 
include maintaining infrastructure, consulting, administrative, medical, and information 
technology work. Since FY2000, 42% of the DoD’s contracting obligations went to services 
(McCormick et al., 2018). Spending on contracted services more than doubled from the 
period beginning in FY2000 to FY2012, when obligations reached $186 billion (GAO, 2013, 
p. 1). Contracting decreased in the years after as part of overall cuts in defense spending, 
but from FY 2015 to FY 2017, service contract obligations saw a 5% increase, from $125.5 
billion to $132.1 billion. 
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Figure 1. Defense Contract Obligations by Area, 2000–2017  
(McCormick et al., 2018) 
According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), the increase in the 
use of contracted services is the result of a lack of strategic planning across the DoD, 
leading to thousands of individual decisions being made through buying activities across 
individual military commands, weapon system program offices, and functional units on 
military bases (GAO, 2013, p. 1). As a result, the management of service contracts has been 
reactive in nature, ignoring key avenues for success at the strategic or transactional level 
(GAO, 2013, p. 4).  
By focusing on service acquisition reforms at the strategic level, which includes such 
actions as capturing knowledge to enable more informed management decisions, 
determining what the agency needs and how to meet those needs, and assessing what 
resources are needed to achieve desired outcomes, more sound decisions can be made for 
individual acquisitions at the transactional level (GAO, 2013, p. 4).  
As part of this focus, the DoD and Congress have passed several measures and 
implemented policies to improve the defense acquisition process and the management of 
contracted services. In a 2010 OUSD(AT&L) memorandum, the DoD established its Better 
Buying Power Initiative, which called for the need to “do more without more” and obtain 
greater efficiency and productivity (GAO, 2013, p. 4). A 2013 update to Better Buying Power 
identified service acquisition as one of seven key areas to focus on.  
The DoD also implemented policies prior to the conception of tripwires that were 
focused on placing greater attention on the review process for service acquisition and their 
management. In a 2002 memorandum by the OUSD(AT&L), service acquisitions were 
required to be reviewed and approved based on dollar thresholds, as well as by acquisition 
strategy. Initially, all proposed service acquisitions that were valued at more than $2 billion 
were required to obtain this review, and in 2006 this threshold was lowered to $1 billion 
(GAO, 2013, p. 6). 
Furthermore, DoD Instruction 5000.02 was issued in 2008 to expand upon these 
review requirements, and listed several factors of service acquisitions that should be 
considered as part of the review process, including 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 5 - 
• The source of the requirement 
• The previous approach to satisfying the requirement 
• The total cost of the acquisition 
• The competition strategy 
• The source selection planning 
A subsequent 2009 memorandum included criteria to be used to evaluate and review 
acquisition strategy, including use of the appropriate contract type, maximization of 
competition, and measurement of contractor performance using objective criteria (GAO, 
2013, p. 7). As part of this push to improve the service acquisition process, tripwires were 
later conceived in order to serve as indicators of risk that would warrant further review when 
triggered. By outlining performance indicators or established thresholds of measurable risk, 
OUSD(AT&L) officials intended to “assess the health of service acquisition, across the 
military departments, potentially down to the program office level” (GAO, 2013, p. 19).  
A tripwire is defined by NAVAIR Instruction 4200.61 (2014) as “a threshold metric 
that warrants further explanation to ensure the proper attention and decision-making rigor 
are present for specific actions.” In the most basic sense, tripwires are parameters set in 
order to achieve the greatest amount of value from contracts. They can measure cost, 
performance, or both, and tend to fall into two main categories: pre-award cost ceilings, 
such as limits on labor rates and other direct costs, and post-award thresholds that can be 
tripped due to performance, such as the use of bridge contracts or additional subcontractors 
not listed on the initial award.  
In the case of a tripwire for cost, for example, hypothetical limits would be set such 
as establishing a price ceiling above an independent government cost estimate (IGCE) for 
the procurement of that service (Professional Services Coucil, 2016, p. 1). If a price exceeds 
this limit, the tripwire has been “tripped,” and an additional review is triggered before the 
proposal can be approved. Generally, the review process requires a higher-level 
organizational leader to approve a waiver for the tripwire before the contract is allowed to 
proceed.  
The process used to establish and implement tripwires has been unclear in the past. 
The Professional Services Council (2016) suggests that “establishing trip wires can and 
should be a natural outcome of determining acquisition risk, acquisition strategy, and 
contract type, and IGCE” (Professional Services Council, 2016, p. 1). While in theory this 
should lead to tripwire thresholds that have an empirical basis, sometimes this is not always 
the case due to faulty reasoning.  
Tripwire Origins and Categories 
The first service contracting tripwires were implemented by the Navy in 2012 in the 
aftermath of a 2010 scandal in which illegal actions were taken by both government officials 
and contractors in the Naval Sea Systems (NAVSEA) Command (Chovotkin, 2012). In an 
effort to provide new visibility into Navy contracting transactions, NAVSEA augmented its 
management controls and increased oversight. Part of this initiative entailed the 
implementation of a series of “tripwires” that required “conscious decisions” by progressively 
higher levels of Navy management. The initial series of service contracting tripwires was 
released by NAVSEA in May 2012 and included the following parameters: 
• Burdened hourly labor rates exceeding $125 
• Excessive variation between proposed and actual rates (>15%) 
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• The addition of subcontractors not listed in the initial award 
• Excessive “Other Direct Costs” (>10% of total labor value) 
• “One bids” received under a competitive solicitation 
• Bridge contracts valued at more than $12.5 million or exceeding a six-month 
period of performance 
• A best value source selection in which the price is greater than 10% over the 
lowest acceptable offeror’s (Marcinko, 2012).  
Crossing any of these tripwires would require approval by the procuring contracting 
officer and the program manager or chief of the contracting office.  
Tripwire use spread to Space and Naval Warfare Systems (SPAWAR) Command in 
late 2012, to Naval Air Systems (NAVAIR) Command in May 2014, and then to other DoD 
components’ contracting offices. In January 2016, the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics issued Instruction 5000.74, stating that 
DoD components were henceforth required to “employ performance management metrics 
and tripwires to the maximum extent practical” to signal areas of potential risk 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2016).  
The list of tripwire categories above is not exhaustive, and specific tripwires and 
metrics should be tailored depending on the contract and the unique requirements and 
services needed. According to DoD Instruction 5000.74, tripwires that are implemented must 
“track and measure performance effectively, support and inform acquisition planning for new 
contracts, contract renewals, and contract re-competes, and be considered during the 
SRRB review and approval process” (OUSD[AT&L], 2016). 
Industry Perception of Tripwires 
DoD leadership was careful to clarify in Instruction 5000.74 that “performance 
metrics and tripwires are not intended to restrict execution, but instead to alert and require 
higher-level awareness and action to remedy potential cost, schedule, or performance 
issues.” Similarly, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) asserted that 
“tripwires are not intended to preclude execution, but instead to require a higher-level 
concurrence or notifications before continuing to execute” (DoN, 2012). In July 2016, the 
Office of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy asserted that tripwires were not “a 
policy brick wall,” nor was their use “a reflection of poor performance.” And a 2013 GAO 
report cited USD officials’ assertions that “tripwires alone are not sufficient to assess service 
acquisition performance.” 
In a system dominated by rules, processes, and binding instructions, these types of 
caveats and qualifications often prove necessary, yet insufficient. Indeed, shortly after 
tripwires were introduced, reports emerged that contracting officers took pains “to avoid 
‘tripping’ any of the thresholds that require[d] higher level oversight, even when they 
believed it was the right action for the Navy” (Chvotkin, 2012). Recently, ReliAscent (2016), 
a government contract accounting firm, summarized what it believed to be the reality of 
tripwire implementation: 
What really happens is contractors are warned not to exceed these costs and 
pricing parameters. Government buyers down in the trenches are already 
spread thin and do what they can to keep the wheels turning. It’s natural for 
them to want to avoid the paperwork and exposure to higher level scrutiny. 
This causes contractors to capitulate to these limitations for fear of losing out 
on a project.  
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This may be an imperfect characterization; nevertheless, it is clear that some 
segment of the acquisition workforce views service contracting tripwires as “brick walls”—
despite the insistence of DoD decision-makers to the contrary.  
There has also been criticism from the industry that there has been too little 
guidance on how and where tripwires are working (Soloway, 2016). Writing shortly after 
Instruction 5000.74 was issued, Soloway noted, “When we see procurements that result in 
high level engineering skills being procured at the tripwire for administrative support (or 
about 1/3 the tripwire prescribed hourly rate for the relevant skills) that becomes an 
important and highly relevant question.”  
Because of this lack of guidance, Soloway (2016) argues that Instruction 5000.74 
was a missed opportunity for the DoD to improve the services acquisition process. Simply 
outlining requirements for tripwires and other acquisition processes was not enough: 
In a system dominated by rules and process, too often at the expense of a 
focus on outcomes, the workforce is far more likely to read and pay attention 
to a binding instruction than it is to anything else. Thus, while it is important to 
clearly lay out all the process and review requirements, that is far from 
enough. We simply cannot afford to miss any opportunity to stress the 
themes, strategies, and concepts that will, in the end, be most central to 
success.    
Preliminary guidance on tripwire implementation, such as in Instruction 5000.74, was 
not the first occasion that DoD mandates have had the unintended effect of constraining the 
ability of acquisition professionals to “think critically” (Kendall, 2014). In a related episode, 
early in this decade the military services and DoD agencies increased their reliance on 
Lowest Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA) criteria in assessing offeror’s submissions. 
According to the GAO, use of LPTA within the DoD rose by 38% between 2009 and 2013 
(Goodman, 2015). The common view within the defense industry is that Better Buying 
Power’s emphasis on reducing costs led contracting personnel to interpret the guidance as 
a mandate to use LPTA to the maximum extent possible. Indeed, in many organizations 
LPTA became the default source selection strategy, even when it was clearly inappropriate.  
The second iteration of Better Buying Power (BBP 2.0), released in November 2012, 
asserted that “technically acceptable” must be better defined in order to ensure that when it 
is used, the government customer receives the required quality of service (OUSD[AT&L], 
2013). In the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress, in an effort to curb LPTA 
overuse, went a step further, declaring that LPTA is inappropriate “in circumstances that 
would deny the department the benefits of cost and technical trade-offs in the source 




3 The 2017 NDAA specifically recommends against the use of LPTA for the following acquisitions: (1) 
information technology services, cybersecurity services, systems engineering and technical 
assistance services, advanced electronics testing, audit or audit readiness services, or other 
knowledge-based professional services; (2) personal protective equipment; or (3) knowledge-based 
training or logistics services in contingency operations or other operations outside the United States, 
including in Afghanistan or Iraq. 
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As with LPTA, similar questions must be asked when evaluating the effectiveness of 
service contracting tripwires. Have they measurably improved service acquisition outcomes? 
Or have they instead only added rigidity and further complexity to the federal acquisition 
system? 
Tripwire Metrics 
In some cases, it is unclear whether the initial threshold values outlined by NAVSEA 
in 2012 have an empirical basis (e.g., the post-award limitation on subcontracting or the 
constraint on selecting best value), or if in other cases they are the result of faulty reasoning. 
The burdened labor rate of $125 per hour, for instance, is coincidentally just under the 
DoD’s top billable rate to other federal agencies for military pay grade level 0–10, for a four-
star general or admiral ($143 per hour, or $297,624 per year; OUSD, 2012). Even if the DoD 
believes that no contractor should make more than a general, the fact remains that this 
billable rate reflects little more than then a general’s salary, healthcare, and housing 
allowance ($290,762 per year, or $140 per hour; OUSD, 2012). 
A more realistic burdened hourly labor rate for a contractor would account for all 
associated indirect costs, including training, recruiting, infrastructure, management, 
administration, security, capital equipment, facilities, as well as many other factors (Gansler, 
Lucyshyn, & Rigilano, 2011). Even then, it is unclear whether the rate would be competitive 
with commercial market rates to recruit and retain the best and brightest individuals, 
especially in high demand service industries such as systems engineering, information 
technology, cybersecurity, and advanced electronics testing, for example.   
Literature Review 
There have been many studies on principal–agent theory analyzing the effects of 
control and monitoring of the agent by the principal, specifically related to cost. There is 
evidence to suggest that implementing controls like those found in tripwires related to costs, 
such as the labor rate tripwire, may have unintended adverse outcomes. Falk and Kosfeld 
(2006) find that there is a hidden cost to control, specifically that when performance 
thresholds are implemented, the agent will choose a performance level that exceeds the 
threshold, but one that is at a lower level than if no control at all were exercised (p. 1612). 
This is because the control and performance thresholds can be interpreted as a lack of trust 
from the principal, and that they are being implemented due to an expectation of low 
performance. A more effective way to manage performance, according to the authors, is to 
use a well-structured incentive contract that will penalize opportunistic agents and increase 
their motivation to perform at a high level.  
Decarolis (2014) researches some of the potential consequences of focusing too 
heavily on achieving lower costs, specifically at the award stage of a contract. By studying 
the impacts of the use of first price sealed bid auctions (FPAs) in Italy to award contracts for 
public works, Decarolis concludes that these efforts to achieve cost savings resulted in lower 
winning prices for the contracts, but at least half of these initial cost savings were erased 
due to ex-post renegotiations of the contract due to low quality work, cost overruns, and time 
delays. A major implication of focusing on low priced bids outlined by the author is that 
bidders will be incentivized to estimate an optimistically low cost initially to win the contract, 
and then “gamble” on the actual final cost of the project being similar to the original price (p. 
113). As seen with LPTA, effective bid screening is crucial in order to prevent offers that are 
“too good to be true.” 
Cameron (2000) makes similar conclusions, specifically that when RFPs contain very 
specific and very strict criteria relating to price, desired experience, technical characteristics, 
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control over output, and location, contractors will be constrained in their use of discretion to 
benefit contract performance. Too rigid performance evaluation criteria will cause overall 
cost and risk to increase. According to Cameron, using this approach will achieve cost 
savings initially, as it will cause reductions in initial bid prices, but in the long run the 
probability of a costly breach of contract will increase significantly (p. 279).    
Kagel and Levin (1986) conduct a similar analysis as Decarolis, focusing on the 
“winners curse” phenomenon and outlining how auctions in which there are a large number 
of bidders can result in less ideal outcomes due to the occurrence of more aggressive 
bidding. In order to formulate bids, firms must obtain an unbiased estimate of the value of 
the contract, and then come up with an amount that is a function of this estimate. According 
to the authors, the winning bid will therefore be the one that is based off of the most 
optimistic value estimate, which can result in below normal or negative profits for the winning 
firm (p. 894). The authors conclude that, especially in auctions with a larger number of 
bidders, these conditions exacerbate adverse selection problems and other issues 
mentioned in previous literature (p. 917). 
Additional evidence suggests that instead of monitoring inputs and costs, focusing on 
outputs is more effective. Zhao (2008) argues that because agents have private information 
on how their actions will affect the objective of the principal, contracting based on output is a 
better way to elicit some of this information (p. 1620). Zhao argues that a performance 
contract that awards incentives based on measures of output is more effective than 
separately monitoring and compensating for individual tasks within a contract (p. 1625).  
Spilbur (1990) focuses on the necessity of implementing the proper incentives and 
enforcement measures to ensure that the contract is carried out properly after award. If 
contracts are not enforced, according to Spilbur, the auction and bidding mechanism will 
unravel because there will be no incentive not to bid low and break the contract in the case 
of a cost overrun. If the most qualified firm is not selected from an auction, problems will 
arise due to the private information possessed by the firm about their costs and ability to 
perform. High-cost-overrun firms will be unable to perform if a cost overrun occurs, so they 
will bid low to cover their costs of performance and if necessary, breach the contract if the 
appropriate incentives for performance do not exist. Low-cost-overrun firms are also forced 
to lower their bids in order to stay competitive, also to protect against cost overruns (p. 326). 
This illustrates the need for proper contract enforcement mechanisms to ensure that 
contractual performance remains at an acceptable level.   
The level of uncertainty and risk present in a contract also influences what type of 
monitoring and control should be used. Prendergast (2002) argues that when a contract has 
a higher level of certainty, individual inputs can be more easily monitored, but when 
situations are more uncertain and contain a higher level of risk, outputs should be observed 
and compensation should be based accordingly (p. 1072). In more stable scenarios, the 
principal has a much better idea of what the agent should be doing and how much it should 
cost, but in situations that are more uncertain, the principal has less of an idea of which 
specific inputs and activities the principal should be focusing their time on. In these cases, 
paying based on contract performance can be necessary to induce the appropriate actions 
by the agent, since measures of inputs are less likely to be effective (p. 1100). 
The problem of information asymmetry during the bidding process for government 
contracts is analyzed by McAfee and McMillan (1986). The two main issues they outline are 
adverse selection on the part of the government, who cannot directly observe the production 
costs of the bidding firms and therefore cannot always know which is in fact the most 
efficient choice, and moral hazard on the part of the bidder, who knows it must keep its bid 
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low in order to maintain competitiveness with its rivals and knows that the government does 
not know what actions it is taking to keep costs low (p. 326). 
As a result, McAfee and McMillan (1986) conclude that it is necessary to structure a 
contract with the proper incentives in order to balance the desires of stimulating competition 
between bidders and ensuring that risk is shared between the contractor and government 
(p. 327). When it is possible to observe the true valuation of the work needed to complete a 
contract, payments can be made based on both the bid price and the true valuation. Since it 
may not be possible to monitor the subsequent actions of a winning bidder, making 
payments based on valuation can introduce the moral hazard problem, so the benefits from 
making payments based on valuation should be weighed against the potential losses from 
moral hazard (p. 336). 
Amirkhanyan (2008) outlines how greater collaboration between the principal and 
agent can lead to better forms of performance management than through control alone. The 
author analyzes collaboration in state and local government contracts and suggests that 
better performance outcomes can be achieved when collaboration exists between both 
parties. Collaboration is defined in this study as “the prevalence of input seeking, 
negotiations, and other joint activities used to enhance or modify contracts” (p. 524).  
According to Amirkhanyan (2008), both the principal and the agent play an important 
role in the collaborative process. The principal enforces the contract terms and compliance, 
but the agent retains the ability to maintain flexibility, discretion, negotiation, and 
collaborative problem-solving. Amirkhanyan notes that “if good will and trust exist between 
the agency and the contractor, then the parties will often proceed with the understanding 
that performance expectations will be negotiated, and if necessary adjusted, as the program 
unfolds” (p. 527). 
As a result, collaboration, performance standards and measures can be examined 
jointly by both the principal and agent, both at the time of the contract award and periodically 
afterwards, creating a process where both parties are actively involved in the process. This 
eliminates the need for other types of strong control by the principal. By focusing on 
collaboration rather than control, Amirkhanyan argues that “collaboration creates a positive 
and open culture and helps avoid generic, formalistic, and unreasonable procedures” (p. 
547). When used correctly, collaboration can be a useful tool to facilitate better contract 
outcomes.  
Tripwires Related to Cost 
Pre-award tripwires related to cost include those related to labor rates, other direct 
cost, and best value procurements. Labor rate tripwires are defined as any proposed fully 
burdened labor rate bid on a cost plus or time and materials contract that exceeds 
$260,000, which is equivalent to $125 an hour. Labor rate tripwires may also apply post 
award if labor rates above this threshold are charged to the contract without being including 
in the bid proposal, or if the amount charged exceeds the bid rates by more than 10%. If the 
amount charged exceeds 15%, a higher-level review is required (Marcinko, 2012). 
Tripwires related to Other Direct Costs (ODCs) require approval and monitoring of 
charges when ODCs are estimated to exceed 10% of the contract value or $3 million dollars 
per year, whichever is lower. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines ODCs as 
costs that are not identified as direct labor costs or direct material costs. An example would 
be computer services, consultant services, travel, etc. (Marcinko, 2012; OUSD[AT&L], n.d.). 
In some cases, the tripwires for ODCs have been recently tightened from 10% of the value 
of the labor of the contract to 5% of the value of the labor of the contract.  
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Tripwires related to best value procurements provide oversight into the variation 
between price of a contract awarded through a best value source selection process, and the 
other bids that were received. Best value tripwires require review and approval for the award 
of a contract valued at more than 10% of the lowest bid that is technically acceptable, as 
well as for contracts that are valued at more than $10 million.     
Best Value Procurements 
The DoD has several source selection processes that are used to evaluate contract 
proposals. When using a best value trade-off process, the relative importance of cost or 
price and technical capability and past performance can be weighed against each other in 
order to determine which proposal delivers the greatest benefit to the contract. The DoD 
often indicates in trade-off solicitations that non-cost factors such as ability to meet a 
deadline, understanding of complex technical issues, or proposal of an innovative approach 
would be more important than price in making the award decision. In these cases, a contract 
may be awarded to a higher priced proposal if it is determined that it provides greater 
benefits and is worth paying an additional cost.  
The price differential is the difference in price paid to the offeror awarded the contract 
and the next best offeror in line for the award. In a 2010 GAO study into the use of best 
value trade-off processes by the DoD, a price differential was paid in 21 out of 68 contracts 
in which a price differential was considered. The majority of these price differentials paid 
were less than 5% (GAO, 2010, p. 11). In 29 out of these 68 contracts, the awarded offeror 
had both the lowest price and the highest non-cost factor technical rating. In the remaining 
18 contracts, it was decided not to pay a price differential, due to the determination that a 
lower price in those cases outweighed the advantages of a higher technical rating (GAO, 
2010, p. 15). 
The largest price differential in this sample was a contract with one of 48%, or $13.6 
million greater than the next offeror’s price. In this case, a contract awarded by the Marine 
Corps for burn-resistant clothing for soldiers in Iraq, contracting officials determined that 
paying a much greater price was worth it due to the contract’s ability to provide much 
greater burn protection than the other contract proposals (GAO, 2010, p. 16). 
Although DoD officials acknowledged specific challenges associated with the use of 
best value source selection, including the need to develop meaningful evaluation criteria, the 
additional time needed for evaluation, and the additional business judgement needed, it is 
seen as a valuable tool that provides insight into the ability of a contractor to meet the 
government’s needs and the reasonableness of their approach (GAO, 2010, pp. 16–17). 
Contracts are often awarded to a contractor whose proposal is not the lowest price, 
using best value criteria. Some commands have implemented tripwires to highlight these 
cases. NAVSEA tripwires, for example, require notification and approval for a contract 
awarded to a bid that is greater than 10% of the next lowest bid.  
Analysis of Tripwires Focusing on Cost 
While tripwires based on cost seek to improve performance and acquisition 
outcomes due to the intuitive idea that placing limits on cost will facilitate a better value for 
the government, related literature suggests that implementing controls such as these may 
actually result in the opposite, and less desirable outcomes. This is due to the fact that 
discounts and costs savings at the contract award stage and at individual points within the 
contract do not always translate to the same level of savings throughout the life of the 
contract. Because of issues related to adverse selection and moral hazard, the lowest priced 
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bid will not necessarily result in the best value for the government, especially if work quality 
is sacrificed or lower qualified contractors are used in order to achieve a lower overall cost.  
Initial criticisms of tripwires related to cost mirror some of the similar early criticisms 
of the use of LPTA, particularly that tripwires may be having the unintended consequence of 
placing a greater emphasis on cost, resulting in sacrifices to quality. At a recent National 
Contract Management Association (NCMA) panel, it was suggested that the government 
was seeing more low-quality proposals for RFPs due to the perception that higher quality, 
higher priced proposals would not be competitive during the bidding process. Because of 
the fear that rates exceeding tripwire thresholds would not win contract awards, there was 
concern that in the future, highly experienced personnel would be passed over due to a lack 
of support for paying them higher rates.  
As in the case of LPTA, the concern is that programs can be underbid and put at risk 
when employees are hired at lower salaries and forced to “make it work” (The Percell Group 
LLC, 2013, p. 2). As a result, these lower bid prices and their subsequent quality would be 
costlier in the long run to due increased risk exposure and the negative impacts of cutting 
costs. According to The Percell Group, in cases such as these innovation and technology 
development investments are also likely to be cut, and the initiation of a “death spiral” can 
occur as more experienced and qualified individuals leave to find higher paying positions in 
other industries, leaving less experienced, less productive, and less expensive individuals to 
do the job. Due to these concerns, it is important that tripwires are structured properly so 
that they do not result in higher exposure to risk and restrict room for innovation. 
Initial concerns were also raised that even in cases where higher rates that exceed 
tripwire thresholds were justified and necessary to facilitate higher quality work, less 
experienced acquisition personnel would be hesitant to request approval of these rates. 
Additionally, the issue was raised of whether small business in particular would be 
negatively impacted, as the resulting cuts to subcontracting rates would make it even harder 
for them to compete with larger prime contractors (National Contract Management 
Association, 2013, pp. 4–5).  
Leading Indicators, Price Reasonableness, and Price Realism Analysis 
One of the main initial criticisms of tripwires was that they are based on arbitrary 
thresholds. One way in which tripwires can be developed on an empirical basis rather than 
on arbitrary thresholds is to use leading indicators and other analysis on the price for a 
contract. Leading indicators in particular, when implemented properly, can identify problems 
before they occur by monitoring several different metrics that allow for better control of 
costs, schedule, and performance.  
As previously researched by Gansler and Lucyshyn (2013), leading indicators can be 
designated as pre-contract award indicators used to shape the development of the program, 
and post-award indicators used to manage performance. Leading indicators can be used in 
two distinct ways:  
• To reduce the number of programs that begin development on a week case, 
in order to avoid initiating a costly program that should not have been 
initiated. 
• To provide program managers with early warnings of impending difficulties as 
the program progresses, so that minor issues can be corrected before they 
turn into larger, costly problems (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2013, p. 41).  
Pre-award leading indicators identified by Gansler and Lucyshyn (2013) include 
analyzing initial program requirements, technological readiness, senior leadership support, 
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program manager capabilities, and the presence of experience supporting the organization. 
Post-award leading indicators used to monitor program performance include requirements 
volatility, contract changes, budget stability, funding flexibility, and manufacturing readiness 
(p. 52).  
These leading indicators seek to impact the “iron triangle” of schedule, cost, and 
quality goals for large projects. Similar to other literature that concludes that focusing on 
controlling for cost does not necessarily lead to better outcomes, Gansler and Lucyshyn 
(2013) argue that projects that “fail” in meeting schedule, cost, or quality thresholds may still 
end up delivering beneficial results in the long run. Rushing to complete a project on time 
and under budget may result in failure to meet the expectations of the stakeholders. The 
cases of the construction of the Sydney Opera House and the DoD’s development of the F-
111 Aardvark program are two examples cited of programs that were completed significantly 
behind schedule and over budget but ended up being regarded as highly successful 
programs (p. 62).  
The case of the F-111 Aardvark is a specific example of a highly successful DoD 
program that might never have been completed if leading indicators or tripwires had been in 
place during the 1960s. In the end, the F-111 became one of the most effective all-weather 
interdiction aircraft ever built, capable of conducting precision, long-distance airstrikes in any 
weather condition. At the time of development, however, the numerous unprecedented 
technologies of the F-111 made calculating accurate cost estimates difficult, and costs 
increased rapidly. This makes it necessary to find the proper ways to define and measure 
program success. Leading indicators and tripwires may have the proper intentions, but if 
they are not defined and implemented in the correct ways, they could lead to adverse 
outcomes and negative impacts on important DoD programs.  
Turner and Zolin (2012) specifically examine the development and use of leading 
indicators for large projects with multiple stakeholders. They also suggest that measuring 
project success in terms of cost, schedule, and quality thresholds should receive less 
emphasis, in favor of focusing instead on a project’s outputs, outcomes, and impacts in 
order to more accurately measure the achievement of the desired objectives of multiple 
stakeholders. Because large, complex projects can have meaningful outcomes long after 
their immediate completion, Turner and Zolin (2012) argue that “the perception of success 
by a project’s stakeholders often has little to do with whether the project was completed on 
time, at cost, and with the desired quality” (p.1). 
Price reasonableness and price realism parameters for a contract can also be used 
to establish effective tripwires based on cost. While cost-based tripwires mainly focus on 
limiting prices so they do not exceed a certain amount, analysis of costs that are too low can 
also be valuable. A price reasonableness analysis is required by the FAR for every 
procurement, and focuses on whether an offeror’s proposed price is higher than what is 
expected to be a reasonable cost. On the other hand, a cost realism analysis, which is not 
mentioned in the FAR and not required by every contract, focuses on whether an offeror’s 
proposed price is lower than what is expected for satisfactory performance or to meet the 
technical requirements of the procurement (Tucker, 2016).   
When a price reasonableness analysis concludes that an offered price is not too 
high, it is said to be “fair and reasonable.” A price realism analysis is independent from 
these findings and is only conducted if it happens to be explicitly mentioned by the agency in 
the solicitation. While price reasonableness looks for prices that are unreasonable, price 
realism looks for prices that are unrealistic, which demonstrate a lack of technical 
understanding of the project requirements or pose a performance risk (Lasky, 2017). 
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In some cases, bid protests have been filed with the GAO because competitors to 
the awardee viewed the winning offer as so unreasonably and unrealistically low that it 
would not be possible to compete. The GAO has clarified that it is not “inherently improper” 
for a contractor to make an offer on a fixed-price contract that is so low it would result in little 
to no profit, or even a loss (King, 2013). There may be purely business decisions behind the 
decision to do this, and unless a price realism analysis is specifically required in the contract 
proposal to ensure technical and performance requirements are met, the GAO will not 
generally accept these types of protests as valid.  
Whether price realism or price reasonableness is the most important concern 
depends largely upon the risks associated with a specific contract. The Professional 
Services Council has developed a methodology relating to the risk levels present in service 
contracting (DoD service contract spending growth in cost and complexity). This approach 
may be helpful for guiding critical thinking about tripwire implementation (Professional 
Services Council, 2016).  
The Professional Services Council suggests tripwires should be implemented in 
response to an analysis of the risk assessment of the contract, the contract type, and the 
acquisition strategy that is being used. Their suggestion for service contracts is to use a 
price reasonableness ceiling tripwire above an IGCE or price realism tripwire floor below the 
IGCE. In source selection evaluation, if a selected awardee’s proposed price is above or 
below the pre-defined tripwire, the selection triggers an additional review before being 
finalized. Specifically, emphasis should be placed on the total labor components across 
prime contractors and subcontractors, and the risk levels quantified through an IGCE 
(Professional Services Council, 2016). This guidance recognizes that there are risks posed 
to the government from underpriced bids, as well as those that are overpriced, and suggests 
tripwires to focus on these as well.  
While all tripwires focus on facilitating the achievement of the best value for the 
government from its spending on contracting, some tripwires focus on other criteria besides 
strictly cost levels. For example, tripwires related to contract performance that regulate the 
use of bridge contracts, one bids, and excessive variation between rates can also be used 
to achieve cost savings and may be more effective than focusing on cost alone. NAVAIR, 
OPNAV, and SPAWAR each issued memos in 2012 and 2014 expanding upon different 
tripwire categories. 
Tripwires Related to Contract Performance 
Other tripwires related to contract include those related to the addition of 
subcontractors, the use of bridge contracts, one bid procurements, and excessive variation 
between proposed and actual rates. Tripwires related to the addition of subcontractors state 
that review and approval is required for any subcontractors added to the contract following 
its award. Tripwires related to bridge contracts require review and approval for the use of all 
bridge contracts, as well as additional approvals if the bridge contract value exceeds $10 
million or if a second bridge contract is required. Tripwires related to one-bid procurements 
require the reporting of any instance where only one bid was received for a competitive 
proposal, and requires approval if this procurement is valued at more than $150,000. 
Tripwires related to excessive variation between rates require review and approval of actual 
rates that are more than 15% of what was originally proposed (Marcinko, 2012; ReliAscent, 
2016). 
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Bridge Contracts 
Contracting arrangements referred to as “bridge contracts” are used to ensure that 
there is not a gap in services in a situation where an original contract is set to expire, but a 
succeeding contract has not yet been awarded. When the federal government contracts for 
services, it is sometimes necessary to continue those services after the expiration of a 
contract. Bridge contracts can serve as a useful tool to bridge the gap while a subsequent 
contract is being awarded. However, bridge contracts have also been associated with 
negative effects such as a lack of planning in the acquisition process and higher prices due 
to an absence of competition. This is important because it requires that staff must devote 
resources to awarding a bridge contract at the same time that they are preparing to award a 
subsequent contract.  
Across the federal government, bridge contracts are awarded for a wide variety of 
service contracts (GAO, 2015, p. 11). Twenty-six percent of bridge contracts, the largest 
category, were awarded for professional or administrative services. The next largest 
category, at 23.3%, was for IT services. Other categories include utilities, housekeeping, 
research and development, and maintenance.  
The need for a bridge contract can arise from a number of delays in the acquisition 
process, including: 
• Changes in contract requirements or delays in the requirements being 
submitted by the requiring agency. 
• Discovery that the planned contract vehicle cannot be used, or other 
problems at the contracting office relating to the review and approval boards. 
• Bid protests of the contract award (IDA, n.d. p. 33). 
One of the most common causes of delays resulting in the use of bridge contracts is 
late completion of acquisition planning documents needed to solicit a follow-on contract, 
such as statements of work (GAO, 2015, p. 21). Some of the main causes of these delays in 
acquisition planning include understaffing issues for contracting staff or staff that are 
inexperienced, a lack of clarity about contract specifications due to a lack of training in 
writing requirements, and a lack of acquisition planning, such as underestimating how long 
the competition or negotiation process will last (IDA, n.d., p. 34). Issues related to 
coordination between program offices and contracting offices were also highlighted by the 
GAO, particularly that program offices do not allow contracting officials enough time to 
conduct an acquisition planning process that would include the desired level of opportunities 
for competition, and that statements of work were often submitted late and required 
extensive revision before being published (GAO, 2015, p. 23).  
When it becomes apparent that a base contract will expire before a follow-on 
contract to meet the same requirements is awarded, two main types of bridge contracts are 
considered by contracting officers in the face of time constraints posed by the expiration of 
the contract:  
• Extend the current contract for up to six months 
• Award the incumbent contractor a short term, stand-alone contract on a sole-
source basis  
While a single formal definition of a bridge contract does not exist, they can be 
established under several authorities, including the FAR part allowing for an “option to 
extend services clause” in the contract (GAO, 2015, p. 4). Although sole-source contracts 
such as these are an important tool for many federal agencies in times of emergencies or 
time constraints, there have been concerns that poor acquisition planning has resulted in 
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bridge contracts being used too frequently. This often results in limiting (albeit temporarily) 
competition.  
There is, however, no requirement in the FAR to track bridge contracts. According to 
a 2015 GAO report, none of the federal agencies reviewed had agency-level policies to 
track their use of bridge contracts, and limited or no insight into their use existed. Particularly 
within the DoD, policies at the department level did not exist because previous concern over 
the use of bridge contracts had not been raised (GAO, 2015, p. 6). 
However, within the DoD, the Navy through its tripwires, and also the Defense 
Logistics Agency (DLA) implemented policies regarding the use of bridge contracts. The 
Navy process requires a justification and approval (J&A) document and a request for 
authorization to award a bridge contract. This documentation requires an explanation for the 
rationale behind the award of the bridge contract, the urgency of the requirement, and the 
signatures of the program manager and the contracting officer (GAO, 2015, p. 8).   
Navy officials reported that the total value of bridge contracts awarded in FY2014 
exceeded $1.6 billion. While it is too early to quantify, Navy officials found that the 
implementation of the tripwire policies regarding bridge contracts has resulted in “a cultural 
shift away from more frequent use of bridge contracts and helped significantly curb 
prolonged use of bridge contracts” (GAO, 2015, p.9). Data from NAVSEA supports this 
conclusion, and reflects a decline in bridge contract usage. In FY2016, 23 instances of 
bridge contracts were reported across the NAVSEA command. This subsequently dropped 
to 15 in FY 2017 and seven in FY 2018. One bridge contract was reported during the first 
quarter of 2019. The DLA awarded $1.3 billion in bridge contracts in FY 2014 and saw 
similar reductions in their use following the implementation of internal review processes. 
DLA officials found that requiring approval for the award of bridge contracts is an effective 
deterrent to their use when there is not a good reason to do so.  
This goes along with the conclusions of a study by the IDA into the use of sole-
source contracts, that bridge contracts are not a problem because of a lack of competition, 
but due to issues with acquisition planning. According to the IDA, nearly one in four sole-
source service contracts awarded by the DoD was a bridge contract. While the total contract 
value for these bridge contracts was relatively small, about 10% of the total of sole-source 
contracts, costs to the DoD for their administration where much more significant. The main 
issue with bridge contracts, therefore, comes from process inefficiencies, particularly the 
costs for preparing and administering them by the requiring agency, the contract officer, and 
the administrator. The use of bridge contracts, except when they are absolutely necessary, 
places unnecessary strain on the DoD contracting workforce, who at the same time must 
plan for a follow-on contract for the required services (IDA, n.d. pp. 39–40). 
Another issue with bridge contracts identified by the GAO is the use of one or more 
subsequent “bridges” lasting longer than the typical period of performance of six months or 
less (GAO, 2015, p. 12). This creates additional challenges and inefficiencies, as in some 
cases the full length and cost of the bridge contract is not clearly documented by J&A 
statements. Because of this, agency officials signing off on bridge contracts only see the 
estimated value and length at the time of its award, rather than the full time and cost if 
multiple “bridges” are required (GAO, 2015, p. 14).  
The GAO found that although the Navy had similar uses of bridge contracts to other 
agencies, the Navy documentation of bridge contracts was much stronger and identified the 
reasons for the use of each bridge contract and detailed their full length and cost (GAO, 
2015, p. 16). The management of bridge contracts by the Navy tripwires and DLA were both 
concluded to be important steps toward achieving better insight into their use. Better 
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tracking and managing of bridge contracts across the federal government can result in their 
use only when necessary for a short period of time, reducing the likelihood that the 
government overpays for services due to a lack of competition (GAO, 2015, p. 28).     
Sole-Source Procurements (One Bids) 
While awarding contracts through full and open competition is one of the main goals 
of the federal acquisition system, in some circumstances this is not practical or does not 
occur. In FY 2013, the DoD awarded 43% of its contracts for products and services without 
competition (GAO, 2014, p. 1). Written justifications that outline a specific exemption to the 
full and open competition rules are generally required by the FAR for these procurements.  
Some examples for instances when contracting without full and open competition is 
justified include when there is only one responsible source that can satisfy the agency 
requirements, in the case of an unusual or compelling urgency, or when it is in the interest of 
national security. “Only one responsible source” is a common justification across the DoD, 
particularly for weapons systems or specialized equipment that is at a stage in its life cycle 
where competition is not economically viable (GAO, 2014, p.5).  
Sole-source procurements may also occur unintentionally, such as when only one 
bid is received for an RFP. Tripwires can provide additional review and oversight in these 
cases. If it is too late to cancel the RFP and resubmit it, the contract can still be awarded 
following proper notification that only one bid was received and if the proposal is found to be 
reasonable and technically acceptable. Further review is then required in order to provide 
insight into why only one bid was received, for example by analyzing the RFP for any issues 
that may inadvertently limit competition.   
Findings and Conclusions 
Our research outlines that there are important distinctions to be made between the 
different tripwire categories, and that the effectiveness and challenges associated with each 
varies. An important distinction to be made is that although tripwires related to cost, 
specifically tripwires placing limits on labor rates, have caused some challenges, others 
such as tripwires for bridge contracts, best value premiums, and one bids, that deal more 
with contract performance after award had noticeable results in improving acquisition 
outcomes. One reason for this is that the labor rate tripwire is the one that has the most 
impact on contractors because, unlike the others that are reactive in nature, labor rates are 
controlled by the contractors in regard to the rates that they charge.  
Data on the other tripwire categories reflects their impacts. Tripwires related to 
bridge contracts provided insight into their use and reduced the total amount of bridge 
contracts used, leading to better acquisition planning. Tripwires relating to one bids also led 
to better acquisition outcomes by providing greater insight into why only one bid was being 
received for a proposal. And tripwires related to best value procurements provided important 
insight into whether or not the best value was being attained as a result of paying more for a 
contract. 
Tripwires in every category serve an important oversight function. They provide Navy 
contracting officials with insight into how much is being paid for labor, or how procurements 
can be made more efficiently. By providing contract managers with this information, more 
efficient service contracting efforts can be made.   
A point repeatedly emphasized is that tripwires are not contract requirements and 
that they should not be thought of as hard limits that are violated if exceeded. In many 
cases, such as when the cost of labor rates requires further review, it is perfectly appropriate 
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and reasonable to pay above the tripwire amount, as long as awareness and notification of 
what is being paid is provided. Therefore, tripwires should not be thought of as a barrier to 
contracting. 
This is especially true if there is the proper justification for taking the action that 
“trips” the tripwire. In this case, there should not be any barriers to them being approved. If 
the justification is, approval will be more difficult. An example would be the use of 
subsequent bridge contracts. While the first bridge contract could be easily approved, if it 
was necessary for the contract, subsequent bridge contracts would be much harder to justify 
and get approved. In this case, tripwires would be having their intended outcome by limiting 
this action.    
However, there are still some concerns that exist in the industry regarding tripwires, 
particularly regarding the labor rate tripwire. While some of this was an initial short-term 
reaction that subsided as contractors became more aware of tripwire requirements and how 
to work with them, issues still remain, particularly among individuals who are newer or not 
used to the tripwire policy or the waiver request process. Despite the emphasis that tripwires 
are not a barrier to contracting, the industry still sees them as a challenge in some cases, 
such as when the labor rate tripwire is set, but there is a specific, particularly skilled 
individual that is desired for the job that requires payment above that amount. 
This supports the academic literature suggesting that controlling for cost can have 
unintended adverse outcomes. If the labor rate tripwire cannot be easily waived for an 
individual that requires a higher labor rate due to their expertise or training, the initial cost 
savings achieved by awarding the contract to a cheaper contractor could eventually be 
erased and cost more in the long run due to lower quality work and inadequate 
performance. As seen with LPTA, discretion should be used in the application of the labor 
rate tripwire to ensure that it is achieving the intended outcomes.  
Additionally, there is a view in the industry that the labor rate tripwire amount is 
based on an arbitrary amount, and does not take into account unique factors or 
circumstances and the acquisition of special types of procurements. The burdened labor 
rate of $156 per hour is uniform across different labor categories and across locations. And 
although labor rates may include a small adjustment each year for inflation, they are not 
zero-baselined and have not kept up with market changes. 
In addition to adjusting the labor rate formula to ensure it is responsive to these 
conditions, tripwires can also be improved by becoming more uniform across the entirety of 
the DoD. Different commands have different tripwires that are not uniform, since OSD policy 
requires tripwires to be implemented but have not specifically outlined what they should look 
like, commands been left to develop and establish their own. This has the potential for 
creating confusion within the contractor community. If this policy is to be continued, more 
specific guidance from OSD may be appropriate.   
The DoD faces ongoing challenges associated with the uncertainty in the current 
budgetary environment. While striking the right balance between mitigating requirement 
risks, efficiently and effectively judging offerors, and doing so in a timely manner can be a 
challenging task, it must be achieved to ensure mission success. Contract “tripwires” can 
support improved contracting outcomes, but only if the tripwires are set appropriately. 
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